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Cotter: Prolegomenon to a Memetic Theory of Copyright: Comments on Lawren

PROLEGOMENON TO A MEMETIC THEORY OF COPYRIGHT:
COMMENTS ON LAWRENCE LESSIG'S THE CREATIVE
COMMONS
Thomas F. Cotter'
I would like to thank the Florida Law Review for inviting me to
respond to Professor Lawrence Lessig's Dunwody Lecture, The Creative
Commons.' As the following discussion will show, there is little if anything
in Lessig's analysis with which I disagree.2 I nevertheless thought it might

* Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property Program, University of Florida
Fredric G. Levin College of Law. I thank Lyrissa Lidsky and Bill Page for their thoughtful
comments. Any errors that remain are mine.
1. 55 FLA. L. REV. 763 (2003).
2. Well, maybe one thing. For most of our history, Congress required authors to comply with
a variety of formalities as a condition to the existence or enforcement of federal copyright rights.
These have included, at various times, deposit and registration requirements; a requirement that
copyright owners take affirmative steps to renew their copyrights; a rule that publication of copies
without copyright notice resulted in the forfeiture of federal copyright; and a requirement that
copies of certain works be manufactured in the United States or Canada. See generally2 MELVILLE
W. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ch. 7 (2002) (discussing formalities other
than renewal); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, §§ 9.02-.07 (discussing renewal); I WILLIAM F.
PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE

ch. 5 (1994) (discussing formalities). Over the years,

Congress has prospectively abolished most but not all of these formalities. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(a)(3)(B) (2003) (since 1992, making copyright renewal automatic, for works for which
renewal otherwise would have been required); id. §§ 401-405 (effectively making copyright notice
optional with respect to works published on or after March 1, 1989); id. § 407(a) (requiring deposit
of works published in the United States, but stating that compliance is not a condition of copyright
protection); id. § 408(a) (making registration optional); id. § 601(a) (requiring U.S. or Canadian
manufacture only for certain works published on or before July 1, 1986). But see id. § 304(a)(4)
(providing incentives to register a claim to copyright renewal); id. §§ 401(d), 402(d) (providing
incentives to use copyright notice); id. § 407(d) (providing monetary penalties for failure to
deposit); id. §§ 410(c), 412 (providing incentives to register); id. § 411 (a) (requiring registration
of United States works, as defined in § 101 of the Copyright Act, as a precondition to filing a civil
action for infringement). In his lecture, Lessig appears to advocate reintroducing deposit and
registration requirements. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 767-68. He makes this point more explicitly
in his recent book, in which he also advocates reintroducing copyright renewal. See LAWRENCE
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS INA CONNECTED WORLD 250-52 (2001)
[hereinafter LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS] (proposing that copyright owners should be entitled to, at
most, fifteen renewable five-year terms); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
INDEFINITELY RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT (U.

Chi. L. Sch. John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working Paper

No. 154 (2d Ser.) 2002), availableat http://ssm.com/abstractid=319321 (discussing the merits of
either an indefinitely renewable copyright, or a copyright that could be renewed periodically for up
to 100 years). Lessig does not advocate resuscitating copyright notice requirements or the blatantly
protectionist manufacturing requirement. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 774-75.
For now, I remain skeptical of the notion that the reintroduction of copyright formalities would
be a worthwhile endeavor. For one thing, reintroducing mandatory formalities into U.S. law might
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be useful in this Essay to sketch out the contours of a body of research I am
just beginning to undertake, and which I hope might lead to a better
understanding of several bodies of law, including intellectual property law.
This body ofresearch is based upon an emerging field known as memetics,
which proposes a new theory of how information evolves and is transferred
from one "host" to another.' More specifically, the theory posits that units
of information, dubbed "memes," replicate and evolve in ways that are
analogous in some respects to the replication and evolution of genes. 4 I will
suggest in this Essay that memetics might illuminate some aspects of
copyright law, including some of the issues Lessig discusses in his lecture.

require the United States to withdraw from international copyright treaties, as Lessig admits. See
LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra, at 330 n.14; see also Beme Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 [hereinafter Berne Convention], revised by July 24,
1971, art. 5(1), 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (stating that the
enjoyment and exercise of copyright rights "shall not be subject to any formality"); Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1201
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs] (requiring member nations to comply with, inter alia, article 5 of the
Berne Convention); WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 1(4), 36 I.L.M. 65, 68 (1997)
(same); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 20, 36 I.L.M. 76, 87
(1997) (providing that the enjoyment and exercise of rights guaranteed under the treaty "shall not
be subject to any formality"). Whether withdrawal from all of these treaties would be desirable is,
in my view, doubtful. In any event, I suspect that it might be better to expend efforts toward the
achievement of more attainable goals-although I admit that, if the definition of an attainable goal
is one that does not violate any treaty provision, the number of such goals is rapidly decreasing. See
Berne Convention, art. 7(1) (specifying a minimum copyright term, for most works, of life of the
author plus fifty years). More generally, it is arguable that formalities are consistent with a
utilitarian theory of copyright, inasmuch as only those works whose authors care about (are
motivated by) the copyright incentive will bother to comply with the relevant formalities. Works
whose authors are not so concerned or motivated will fall into the public domain, where they should
be. See generally Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in
Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1669-72 (1998) (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of formalities). Historically, however, some formalities-most
notably, the copyright notice requirement-sometimes resulted in inadvertent forfeiture of
copyright and could be quite unpredictable in their application. For an illuminating discussion of
the intricacies of copyright notice, see Estate of King v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1222 (1 th Cir.
1999). Whetherthe potential benefits of formalities are, on balance, worth the trouble is to my mind
unclear.
3. For a sampling of the relevant literature on memes, see ROBERT AUNGER, THE ELECTRIC
MEME: A NEW THEORY OF How WE THINK (2002); SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE
(1999); RICHARD BRODIE, VIRUS OF THE MIND: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MEME (1996);
DARWINIZING CULTURE: THE STATUS OF MEMETICS AS A SCIENCE (Robert Aunger ed. 2000);
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE ch. 11 (1976); DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS
IDEA: EVOLUTIONANDTHE MEANINGS OF LIFE ch. 12 (1995); LEE ALAN DUGATKIN, THE IMITATION
FACTOR: EVOLUTION BEYOND THE GENE (2000); AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT CONTAGION: How
BELIEF SPREADS THROUGH SOCIETY (1996). See also JOURNAL OF MEMETICS-EVOLUTIONARY
MODELS OF INFORMATION TRANSMISSION, availableat http://jom-emit.cfpm.org (a peer-reviewed
academic journal).
4. See, e.g., AUNGER, supra note 3, at 2-3.
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The ultimate significance of memetic theory to copyright nevertheless
remains an open question, and I hope to elaborate upon some of the ideas
presented herein in a forthcoming, more comprehensive, work.
Memetics is probably best viewed as an offshoot of a body of work
within evolutionary theory which posits that evolution operates largely at
the level of the individual gene, rather than at the level of the organism.5
In other words, evolutionary changes occur, and sometimes persist, not
because these changes necessarily help individual organisms to survive,
but rather because they help individual genes to replicate and proliferate,
in whatever organism those genes happen to be located.6 The so-called
"selfish gene" theory offers an explanation for some forms of animal and
human behavior, such as altruism, that are difficult to explain in terms of
their benefit to the individual organism.7
In his 1999 book, The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins speculated that
genes might not be the only "replicators" that exist in nature and that
undergo a Darwinian process of natural selection! In particular, Dawkins
proposed that human culture might be the end-product of natural selection
operating upon units of information, which he termed "memes." 9 At that
time, Dawkins did not attempt a rigorous definition of the term "meme,"
but suggested that memes included such things as "tunes, ideas, catchphrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches."'"
The Oxford English Dictionary now defines a meme as "[a]n element of
a culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic means,
esp. imitation,"" and other "memeticists" have proposed alternative
definitions. 2 Robert Aunger, for example, has recently delineated atheory
according to which memes are configurations within the brain that can
replicate themselves in other parts of the brain and in other brains. 3
Memeticists have argued that memes satisfy the three criteria that must
exist for natural selection to take place, namely (1) heritability or
replication, (2) variation, and (3) fitness.' 4 Heritability means simply that

5. For discussions of what has come to be called the "selfish gene" theory, see, e.g.,
DAWKINS, supra note 3; ROBERT L. TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 137-40 (1985); W.D. Hamilton,
The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour, 7 J.THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1 (1964).
6. See DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 88.
ch. 6.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 192.
9. See id. ch. 11.
10. Id.at 192.
11. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ADDITIONS SERIES 293 (Michael Proffitt ed., 1997).
12. See, e.g., BLACKMORE, supranote 3, at 63-66; BRODIE, supranote 3, at 27-33; DENNETT,
supra note 3, at 344; DUGATKIN, supra note 3, at 117.
13. See AUNGER, supra note 3, at 196-97.
14. See BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 10-11; DENNETr, supra note 3, at 343.
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an entity is capable of passing on certain attributes to another entity. 5
Memeticists posit that memes replicate themselves by either vertical
transmission (e.g., a parent passes along a religious tradition to a child) or
horizontally (e.g., I tell you a joke). 16 Memes allegedly also satisfy the
second criterion, variation. Variation can be unintentional (e.g., you forget
the exact words I used to tell you the joke) or intentional (you deliberately
alter the joke). 7 Third, memes may encounter more or less favorable
environments, and those memes that manifest variations conferring some
selective advantage in their environments will replicate at a faster
rate-will be more "fit"-than their non-varying competitors."
Significantly, the interests of a meme may differ from the interests of its
human "host." Much of the perverse appeal of memetics centers on the
question of how "bad" memes-memes that increase the risk of injury or
death to their hosts or others, for example-may proliferate. 9
Indeed, it is the persistence of behaviors that appear contrary to the
host's interest that provides perhaps the best evidence in support of the
existence of memes. To be sure, a meme that kills its host before the host
can pass on the meme will not last long, but bad memes can leave their
host alive long enough to "infect" others. For example, a meme that
encourages suicide bombing may kill its host, but it also may garner
enough publicity and sympathy to succeed in replicating inside the brains
of other hosts.2" Additional support for the existence of memes stems from
the professed ability of memetics to explain aspects of human culture that
other accounts, such as evolutionary psychology, do not explain quite as
well. One example might be the content of religious beliefs. Although
some evolutionary psychologists and biologists have developed theories of
why human beings have a taste for religion,2' memetics may offer a

15. See BLACKMORE, supranote 3, at 14; DAWKINS, supranote 3, at 15-16; DENNETT, supra
note 3, at 343. Dawkins further suggests that for natural selection to take place, replicators must
exhibit fidelity, fecundity, and longevity. See DAWKINS,supra note 3, at 194. Aunger distinguishes
heritability from replication and goes into considerable detail regarding the conditions that are
necessary for replication to occur. See AUNGER, supra note 3, at 25-26, 73-75.
16. See BLACKMORE, supranote 3, at 14; DAWKINS,supra note 3,at 192-94; DENNETT, supra
note 3, at 343.
17. See BLACKMORE, supranote 3, at 14; DAWKINS, supranote 3, at 194-95; DENNETT, supra
note 3, at 343.
18. See BLACKMORE, supranote 3, at 14; DAWKINS, supranote 3, at 196-99; DENNETr, supra

note 3, at 343.
19. See BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 27; DENNETT, supra note 3, at 349.
20. See DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 110-11; DENNEr, supra note 3, at 362.
21. See, e.g. E.O. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE ch.8 (1978) (speculating that some religious
beliefs provide a genetic advantage); STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS 557 (1997)
(suggesting that religious beliefs are an evolutionary by-product of other brain functions). For a
more recent account, see DAVID SLOAN WILSON, DARWIN'S CATHEDRAL: EVOLUTION, RELIGION,

AND THE NATURE OF SOCIETY (2002). For evidence that belief in God is tied to the biological
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complementary, and perhaps more precise, explanation for why some
specific beliefs and doctrines (such as the belief in an afterlife, religious
celibacy, and so on) have been more successful in replicating themselves
in human brains than have other, competing memes 2
Although the evidence that memes exist seems reasonably persuasive
to me, I will not attempt in this Essay to prove whether memes really exist,
and, if so, which particular version of memetic theory is correct. 3 What I
will suggest, however, is that if memetics succeeds in establishing itself as
a science, it may have some implications for copyright law-and perhaps
that even if memetics does not so succeed, it nevertheless may provide a
useful perspective on, or metaphor for, certain phenomena that we observe
within the copyright system. In the following pages, I will sketch out a few
possible ways in which memetics might illuminate some aspects of
copyright law, though as noted above, I plan to explicate these and other
possibilities more fully in a forthcoming article.
As suggested above, memes (assuming they exist) are, more or less,
ideas that inhabit human brains.24 In accordance with this definition,
individual memes would seem to be analogous to ideas or facts, in which
copyright does not subsist.25 "Works of authorship," such as literary and
musical compositions, might then be viewed as mutually supportive
combinations of memes, or "memeplexes. 26 If so, then it might be useful

structure of the brain, see ANDREW NEWBERG ET AL., WHY GOD WON'T GO AWAY: BRAIN SCIENCE
AND THE BIOLOGY OF BELIEF (2001).
22. See BLACKMORE, supranote 3, ch. 15; BRODIE, supra note 3, ch. 10; LYNCH, supra note
3, ch. 5. Among the "Good Tricks," see infra note 62 and accompanying text, of (some) religious
memes are their ability to answer questions that the human brain finds of interest (what is the
meaning of life?), to engender a sense of belonging and a sense of beauty, to kindle altruism, to
discourage consideration of competing religious memes, and so on. See BLACKMORE, supra note
3, at 188-95. Moreover, some memes (religious or not) may have a better chance of survival when
bundled together with other, reinforcing memes in a "coadapted meme complex," or "memeplex."
See infra note 26 (discussing memeplexes). Blackmore further speculates that when particular
religious memes "infect" a particular group, those memes may confer a survival advantage or
disadvantage upon members of the group in relation to other groups, thus either enhancing or
retarding their ability to proliferate over time-and perhaps effecting evolutionary change at the
group level. See id. at 195-202.
23. There are many critiques of memetics, among them that there is no physical proof of
memes' existence; that memes, if they exist, do not exhibit sufficient fidelity to replicate in
accordance with natural selection; and that memetics does not explain any phenomena more
convincingly than other theories. For responses to some of these critiques, see BLACKMORE, supra
note 3, at 53-66; DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 193-94; DENNETr, supra note 3, at 356.
24. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003).
26. Memeticists speculate that memes sometimes combine themselves with other, mutually
reinforcing, memes so as to increase their probability of replicating. See BLACKMORE, supra note
3, at 19-20; DAWKINS, supranote 3, at 197-99. Dawkins uses the term "coadapted meme complex"
to describe this phenomenon, but Blackmore and some others now use the catchier phrase
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to think of the copyright system as part of the environment within which
rival memeplexes replicate and evolve. On this view, changes in copyright
law will, by affecting the memetic environment, affect the type, number,
and variety of memeplexes that will be produced and disseminated within
that environment. To put it another way, copyright operates as a system of
"memetic engineering"--but if so, then copyright might be susceptible to
problems similar to those that can arise in connection with other novel
"engineering" systems, such as genetic engineering and social engineering.
To illustrate, the first U.S. Copyright Act, as Lessig notes, forbade only
the unauthorized printing, publishing, republishing, and vending of
copyrighted works.27 Copyright extended only to "maps, charts, and
books,"2 and even then only to those maps, charts, and books whose
authors complied with the statutory formalities.29 In addition, copyright
appears to have protected only against the literal or near-literal copying of
a work in substantially its entirety. Early case law permitted content users
to publish unauthorized abridgements," sequels,3 ' and even translations,32
until well into the nineteenth century. Over time, however, Congress
gradually extended copyright protection to other works; 33 created
additional rights, including the adaptation right; 34 and expanded the
copyright term from its initial duration of fourteen years (renewable for an
additional fourteen) to its current term-life of the author plus seventy
years." Moreover, as it exists today, copyright protects not only against
literal copying but, in an appropriate case, against copying such aspects of
the work as its plot 36 and its fictional characters 37 -though deciding
precisely at what level of abstraction such aspects are sufficiently
developed to fall within the "expression," as opposed to the "idea" side of

"memeplex." BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 19; DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 199.
Although a few scholars have considered the extent to which memes or memeplexes are
analogous to copyrighted works, none have addressed this topic in much detail. See J.M. BALKIN,
CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 47-48 (1998); BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 53;
DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 195-96; DENNETT, supra note 3, at 344.
27. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 768.
28. See id.
29. See id.
at 769.
30. See id.
31. See id
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id The adaptation right is the exclusive right to prepare, or authorize the preparation
of, derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2003). A derivative work is a work based upon
another, underlying work. Familiar examples include translations, abridgements, and motion picture
adaptations. See id. § 101.
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2003); Lessig, supra note 1, at 764.
36. See 4 NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[AI[1].
37. See I NIMMER &NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12.
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the line, can be quite difficult.3 8
From the standpoint ofmemetics, this expansion of copyright scope and
duration has conferred upon content owners considerable power to ensure
the fidelity of memetic transmission, to reduce memetic variation, and
more generally to guide the course of memetic evolution; and perhaps
memetic theory can shed light on whether conferring such extensive power
upon content owners is wise. To be sure, there are plausible arguments in
favor of, for example, an expansive adaptation right. In the absence of such
a right, the first person to make a particular adaptation may effectively
preempt the field, discouraging anyone else from adapting the same work;
this may be a bad outcome, if the first adaptor is not as talented as another
adapter would have been. Alternatively, perhaps no one would bother to
create a resource-intensive derivative work, if others were free to create
competing derivative works based upon the same underlying work.39
Others have argued that the adaptation right encourages copyright owners
to create works that will give rise to valuable spin-offs, ° and that it reduces
the probability that overuse will cause the value of a copyrighted work to
fall.4 There are also some potential drawbacks, however, which other
scholars have noted42 and which memetics might further help to illuminate.
Drawing first upon the analogy to genetic engineering, it is conceivable
that too much control and too little variation might retard memeplexes
from evolving in ways that otherwise would be desirable from the
standpoint of their human hosts. Critics sometimes argue that genetic
engineering may reduce genetic diversity in ways that can prove harmful
to human health,4 3 and perhaps memetic engineering can have analogous

38. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)
(formulating the famous "abstractions" test).
39. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J.
283, 379 (1996).
40. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3, at 5:81 (2002).
41. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 13-15.

42. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement in IntellectualPropertyLaw,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1063-65 (1997) (arguing that conferring power upon copyright owners to
control even radical improvements upon their works may inhibit innovation); Netanel, supra note
37, at 377-80 (arguing that the adaptation right serves some legitimate purposes, but that if the right
is too strong it may inhibit valuable transformative uses); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality
in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1996) (arguing that in the typical case the
adaptation right adds no material incentive to create underlying works).
43. See DAVID SUZUKI & PETER KNUDTSON, GENETHIcs: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW

GENETICS AND HUMAN VALUES 307-15 (1989) (discussing how genetic uniformity in the United
States corn crop left that crop uniquely vulnerable to disease); Maurizio G. Paoletti & David
Pimentel, Genetic Engineeringin Agriculture andthe Environment:Assessing Risks and Benefits,
46 BIOSCIENCE 665, 665 (1996). Advocates of genetic engineering, however, have argued that
while monocropping may leave organisms susceptible to disease, monocropping is not a necessary
consequence of genetic engineering. See David R. Purnell, International Implications of New
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consequences. To be sure, the analogy between genes and memes only
goes so far. Although genetic uniformity can leave organisms vulnerable
to unforeseeable changes in the environment, the only effect of memetic
uniformity may be to make life more boring and anodyne. The human
species will survive, even if new authors can use underlying works only as
authorized by the latter works' owners. But a world in which only
authorized, approved, and sanitized derivative works can exist may be
much less interesting than one in which authors and artists have some
freedom to transgress established boundaries. Granted, content owners
have an incentive to authorize the production of derivative works that
people want to see and hear, so perhaps diversity is more, not less, likely
to result from a strong adaptation right."' To the extent that this argument
measures people's wants exclusively in terms of their willingness to pay,
however, critics might counter that it assumes an impoverished view of
human welfare.45 Moreover, some evidence from the related field ofpatent
law suggests that owners are sometimes oblivious to the possibility of
improvements upon their technology, or are satisfied with resting on their
laurels." Thus, although the evidence is not conclusive, there may be some
reasons to fear that too much control will reduce a healthy memetic
diversity.
A second analogy is to social engineering. Scholars such as Friedrich
Hayek and James Scott have condemned social engineering schemes, under
which the state engages in central planning, on several grounds.47 One
Agricultural Biotechnology, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1995). Moreover, since genetic

engineering can accomplish combinations that otherwise would not exist innature, it may increase,
rather than decrease, genetic diversity. See Steven H. Yoshida, The Safety ofGeneticallyModified
Soybeans: Evidence andRegulation, 55 FOOD& DRUG L.J. 193, 193 (2000); see alsoMark Sagoff,
Biotechnology and Agriculture: The Common Wisdom and Its Critics, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL

STUD. 13, 13-14, 31-32 (2001) (noting the conflicting arguments concerning the effect of genetic
engineering upon biodiversity, and that the term "biodiversity" has no clear scientific meaning).
44. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 40, § 5.3, at 5:8 1.
45. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatismand the Law and Economics Movement,
84 GEO. L.J. 2071,2127,2131-32 (1996) (arguing that exclusive reliance upon willingness to pay

as a criterion of social welfare biases the analysis in favor of those with an ability to pay, but also
noting problems with alternative measures of social welfare).
46. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics ofPatentScope,

90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 877, 884-916 (1990).
47. 1 F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W.W. Bartley, III ed.,
1988); JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN

CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). I should note that Scott does not go as far as Hayek in condeming
all social planning, but rather those schemes that he describes as embodying "high modernism." See
SCOTT, supra, at 342-47. I also recognize that there may seem to be some tension between
suggesting that the market may be an imperfect institution for assessing individual preferences, on
the one hand, see supra text accompanying note 42, and then invoking the authority of a superdefender of markets like Hayek, on the other. Some libertarians, however, including Hayek himself,

have expressed a degree of skepticism over the merits of a strong system of intellectual property

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/2

8

Cotter: Prolegomenon to a Memetic Theory of Copyright: Comments on Lawren
DUNWODY COMMENTARY

problem is that central planners can never have perfect knowledge of all of
the social needs and desires that (ideally) they would try to serve.48 A
related problem is that planners are incapable of foreseeing all of the
possible unintended consequences of social engineering programs.49 A
third is that planners, being human, are insufficiently virtuous to manage
such programs in the public interest.5" Perhaps a strong copyright system
can be condemned on similar grounds. To be sure, there is one potentially
significant difference between central planning schemes, on the one hand,
and the copyright system, on the other: under the copyright system,
copyright rights rest in (literally) millions of private hands, and not with
the state. But copyright can, in some though not all cases, confer
government-sanctioned monopoly power upon the holder of the right; even
copyright defenders recognize this fact.5' To the extent that copyright
owners cannot foresee all of the possible uses of their works, or the
consequences of foreclosing some possible developments, we might
encounter problems analogous to-though concededly less disastrous
than-those that can result from social engineering schemes. In short,
rights. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that even advocates of strong property rights must recognize the
need for such amenities as public streets and parks); HAYEK, supra, at 37 (expressing skepticism
over whether the patent system induces meaningful invention); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and
CopyrightsMorallyJustified? The PhilosophyofPropertyRights andIdeal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990) (reviewing libertarian arguments for and against intellectual property
rights, and finding the arguments in favor wanting). Moreover, to the extent that copyright
sometimes confers market power upon content owners, the use of the pricing system to discern
consumer preferences may be imperfect. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21
CARDOZO L. REv. 121, 134 (1999) (arguing that if content owners price above marginal cost,
consumer preferences will not be fully revealed). Whether it is the state or a private actor that exerts
market power, the interests of some potential users may get short shrift.
Hayek's ideas about cultural evolution appear to have been rooted to some extent in biological
thinking, and they arguably anticipate some current ideas in both evolutionary psychology and
memetics. See HAYEK, supra,at 15-16, 21-28, 135-40; see alsoTodd J. Zywicki, Was Hayek Right
About Group Selection After All? Review Essay ofUnto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior, by Elliot Sober & David Sloan Wilson, 13 REv. AUSTRIAN ECON. 81 (2000).
Although this brief essay is not the place to explore the nuances of Hayek's thought on cultural
evolution, I hope to give it fuller consideration in my forthcoming work.
48. See HAYEK, supra note 47, at 77, 79-80, 85-88; SCOTT, supra note 47, at 256, 343; see
also F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 55-56 (1994); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 Am. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
49. See HAYEK, supra note 47, at 7-8, 44-45, 71-72, 81-82; SCOTT, supranote 47, at 11-22,
264, 344.
50. See HAYEK, supra note 47, at 32-33, 44-45,103-04; ScOTT, supra note 47, at 264.
51. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 9 (posing the rhetorical question whether
there are "good substitutes... for Shakespeare's plays or Mozart's piano concertos?"); see also
SCOTT, supra note 47, at 8 (arguing that Hayek and other libertarians fail to note that "the failures
of modem projects of social engineering are as applicable to market-driven standardization as they
are to bureaucractic homogeneity").
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some unguided, serendipitous memetic evolution 2 may be preferable to a
system of centralized control under which, for example, the heirs to the
Brothers Grimm could have arbitrarily vetoed Walt Disney's adaptation of
Snow White."
Another insight from memetics is that the interests of owners and of
their copyrighted memeplexes may sometimes diverge, and the resulting
conflicts may play out in a number of ways. Ex ante, of course, the
interests of the owner and the owner's memeplex tend toward consistency,
because (by hypothesis) the copyright system increases the probability that
the memeplex will be created and disseminated in the first place. Once the
owner has created and published the memeplex, however, their interests
may part, because the owner often has an interest in limitingdissemination.
Economic theory predicts that, to the extent a copyright confers market
power, the owner will limit output and set price at the point at which
marginal revenue equals marginal cost; in a competitive market, price
would be set at marginal cost and output would increase accordingly. 4
From the memeplex's ex post perspective, however, its owner's financial
health is irrelevant, and hence we might expect to see memeplexes
replicating whenever and wherever they perceive a chink in the owner's
copyright "armor."55 On this view, efforts to instill social norms against

52. Perhaps the word "unguided" is too strong. Completely random memetic variation, such
as typographical errors, are not likely to lead to anything a human host would consider an
improvement. See DENNETr, supra note 3, at 125-26. Memetic improvements will be guided by
someone, and thus the question is one of who does the guiding. In this regard, the analogy to
genetic and social engineering problems may not seem precise, but I have suggested above that
problems similar to those that may arise under genetic and social engineering nevertheless may arise
under memetic engineering schemes as well.
53. Actually, the Brothers Grimm benefited as well from having a creative commons. They
based some of their fairy tales upon stories they collected from middle- and upper-class women
friends (who in turn got their material from their nannies and other servants). See Jack Zipes, Once
There Were Two Brothers Named Grimm, Introduction to THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES OF THE
BROTHERS GRIMM xxiv, xxviii (Jack Zipes trans., 1987) (1857) [hereinafter BROTHERS GRIMM].
Other stories they took "directly from books or journals," although the brothers edited their source
material and added some material of their own. Id.
See also THE BROTHERS GRIMM AND FOLKTALE
69 (James M. McGlathery et al. eds., 1988), for several essays discussing, among other things, the
Brothers' methods for collecting source material.
Lessig is certainly right, by the way, when he says that you would not want young children to
read the "original" Brothers Grimm fairy tales, which include such gems as The Jew in the
Thornbush (a story every bit as charming as the name suggests), and a version of the Snow White
story in which the evil stepmother meets her end by being forced to dance in red-hot iron slippers.
Lessig, supra note 1,at 763-64; see also BROTHERS GRIMM, supra, at 204, 398.
54. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death ofCopyright: DigitalTechnology, Private Copying,
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 864-67 (2001).
55. Of course, memes do not really perceive anything. Speaking about memes (or genes, or
other replicators) as if they have conscious desires and motivations is simply a conventional
shorthand for the observation that these entities sometimes appear to human observers to act as if
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copying may be doomed to failure,56 and the ensuing "arms races" between
circumvention and anti-circumvention devices virtually inevitable."
Tensions between owner and memeplex may be even higher when the
memeplex itself carries instructions that tell users, in effect, to "copy me";
an example would be a religious or political text that exhorts its readers to
proselytize others. If the copyright owner subsequently renounces the
religious or political views expressed in the text, his natural inclination
(and perhaps his legal right) may be to suppress the work, but the natural
inclination of readers infected" by the memeplex will be to flout the
copyright laws." Perhaps the strength of the memetic pressure to replicate

they had such desires and motivations. See BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 13; DAWKINS, supra note
3, at 200.
56. As Lessig has noted in another work, there are four ways to try to control behavior: laws,
norms, "architecture" (in the sense of technological constraints), and the market. See LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 87-88 (1999). I am suggesting in the text above
that, if memetics is correct, it may be more difficult than many people realize to establish
meaningful social norms against copying. In a sense, information really does want to be free.
57. References to such competitions as "arms races" are numerous. See, e.g., Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyrightand ControlOver New Technologies ofDissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1628-29 (2001); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:Napster
and the New Economics ofDigital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 319 (2002); cf DENNEr,
supra note 3, at 351 (comparing memes' competition to break through hosts' filtering systems to
an arms race). A further insight is that, to the extent that a work of authorship is a complex of
memeplexes (e.g., a novel consisting in part of fictional characters, plot, and so on), the constituent
sub-memeplexes may find it in their interest, depending upon their environment, to defect and
replicate independently of the parent memeplex. Content owners may have to scramble, for
example, to control the unauthorized uses of their fictional characters. See Leslie A. Kurtz, The
IndependentLegal Lives ofFictionalCharacters,1986 WiS. L. REV. 429 (discussing and critiquing
some aspects of copyright and trademark treatment of fictional characters); see also Rosemary J.
Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized
Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 383-86 (1992) (celebrating the unauthorized use of
famous characters such as Captain Kirk in stories printed in "fanzines"). Moreover, an individual
fictional character may be nothing more than a congeries of individual memes, some of which may
replicate faster if they defect. Thus "Mickey Mouse" as a whole might be better off if he remains
subject to control by Disney, because this control will prevent uses of the character that diminish
his long-term value; but some constituent attributes of Mickey Mouse (the mouse ears?) might
replicate faster as free agents. Cf DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 200 (noting that "[a] simple
replicator... cannot be expected to forgo short-term selfish advantage even if it would really pay
it, in the long term, to do so").
58. Some memeticists analogize memes to viruses or parasites. See, e.g., BRODIE, supra note
3, at 27; LYNCH, supra note 3, at 2. Others caution against the overuse of this analogy, however.
Not all memes are bad; in fact, most are probably benign or even helpful to their hosts. See
AUNGER, supra note 3, at 228-29, 254; BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 22; DENNETT, supra note 3,
at 364-65.
59. See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.
2000) (rejecting fair use defense to a church's unauthorized copying and distribution of a religious
work, where the copyright owner of the work had renounced the views expressed in the work and
suppressed its further publication). I have written extensively about this case elsewhere. See
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under these circumstances should be relevant to the assertion of a fair use
defense, although the precise manner in which memetics might be relevant
60
remains to be worked out.
Finally, memetics might prove relevant to the fair use defense in at least
one additional respect. Some scholars have argued that certain works have
so changed the culture in which we live that, in order to engage that
culture, we must be able (in some contexts, at least) to reproduce
substantial portions of those works, with or without the consent of their
owners; 61 perhaps memetics adds some further weight to this argument.

Thomas F. Cotter, Accommodating the Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Works for Religious
PurposesUnder the FairUse Doctrineand CopyrightAct § 110(3), 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
(forthcoming 2003); Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg'sLegacy: Copyright,Censorship,andReligious

Pluralism,91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
60. Presumably it would have to be something more concrete than "the memes made me do
it." Nevertheless, one possible implication ofmemetics for cases such as Worldwide ChurchofGod,
227 F.3d at 110, is the recognition that religious doctrine can be a very powerful memeplex. Several
memeticists have described religions as memeplexes. See BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 187-203;
BRODIE, supra note 3, ch.10; DAWKINS, supra note 3, at 192-93, 197-99; LYNCH, supra note 3, at
97-133; see alsosupra note 22 and accompanying text. On this view, perhaps a memeticist would
recommend that people who are "infected" by certain religious memes should be entitled to some
form of accommodation, if not under the Copyright Act itself then under the Free Exercise Clause
or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in much the same way that people suffering under other
disabilities are entitled to accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities Act.
Another interesting possibility would be to require copyright owners to exploit their works,
either through compulsory licensing or by deeming their copyrights to be abandoned after a period
of nonuse. Lessig himself has suggested such measures. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 258-59
(suggesting that copyright owners should be required to "use it or lose it," and proposing
compulsory licensing as a possible response to nonuse). At present, lack of use can give rise to a
presumption of abandonment in trademark law, see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2003), but not in copyright.
In some cases, the very same activities may constitute an abandonment of trademark rights in a
fictional character but not of the concomitant copyright rights. See Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870
F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989). Even so, we might want to think about the implications of such a rule a little
more. Suppression and censorship sound bad when the underlying work is good or at least neutral.
But what if the copyright owner of, say, The Turner Diaries decided to suppress that work?
ANDREW MACDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIES (1996). Would that be a bad thing? The problem is

that copyright is supposed to encourage the creation and dissemination of works of authorship, but
it is hardly a necessary consequence that only true and beautiful works will be created. Indeed,
memetics suggests precisely the opposite: that works will be created and disseminated if they are
good replicators, and good replicators need not be good for their hosts or for others. See BRODIE,
supra note 3, at 166 (noting that "valueless and demeaning junk" is often a very good replicator).
61. The point has been made not only with respect to copyrights, but also with respect to

trademarks and celebrity images. See ROSEMARY J.COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW ch. 1(1998); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarksas Language in the PepsiGeneration,65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

397, 397-98, 416-17 (1990); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols andInhabitSymbols, So
Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructingthe Lanham Act andRights ofPublicity, 20 COLUM.-

V.L.A.J.L. & ARTS 123, 137-41 (1996); Wendy J. Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression:
Equalityand Individualismin the NaturalLaw oflntellectual Property,102 YALE L.J. 1533,1583-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/2

12

Cotter: Prolegomenon to a Memetic Theory of Copyright: Comments on Lawren
DUNWODY COMMENTARY

Memeticists claim that the most successful memes are the ones that
develop a "Good Trick," such as selectively changing their environment to
the detriment of other memes.62 Perhaps in some cases the best way to
challenge the power of memes (or memeplexes) that have substantially
changed their environment is to recast those very same memes (or
memeplexes) in a different light. Copyright law permits some such
challenges under the fair use doctrine;63 and while the most common
examples probably are critical reviews and other commentary, the Supreme
Court has recognized that parodies can perform a similar critical function.64
In this regard, a recent case that pushes the limits of the fair use
doctrine is Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.65 In Suntrust Bank, the
Eleventh Circuit vacated an injunction against the publication of Alice
Randall's book The Wind Done Gone-which retells the story of Gone
With the Wind from the standpoint of the slaves-on the ground that the
fair use doctrine probably immunized Randall's use of plot and character
elements from the earlier work.66 The question is whether the court was
correct to, in effect, expand the definition of critique or parody to cover a
work that retells a familiar story from the perspective of other characters;
after all, if The Wind Done Gone is just a sequel, it infringes the copyright
owner's right under current law to prepare derivative works. But if, as
suggested above, the most effective way to critique the memes embodied
in or exemplified by a text is sometimes to recast those memes in a
different perspective, the Eleventh Circuit may well have been correct to
conclude that the defendant's use was fair.67 To conclude otherwise might

1605 (1993); Paul J.Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition:
Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with Vanna, 47 S.C. L. REV. 783, 803-09 (1996).
62. See BLACKMORE, supra note 3, at 27 (stating that memes "might spread because they
appearto provide advantages even when they do not, because they are especially easily imitated
by human brains, because they change the selective environment to the detriment of competing
memes, and so on"); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE: THE GENE As THE UNIT OF

SELECTION 110-11 (1982) (similar); DENNETr, supra note 3, at 349. The term "Good Trick" is
Dennett's. See DENNETT, supra note 3, at 77.
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
64. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-83 (1994).
65. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
66. See id. at 1276.
67. See Note, Originality, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1995-97 (2002) (arguing that the
Eleventh Circuit reached the correct result in SunTrust Bank, but that in characterizing The Wind
Done Gone as a parody, "rather than a work that criticized or commented on subjects outside of the
underlying work, the court downplayed the book's originality and emphasized the extent to which
it simply attacked Gone With the Wind'). The author concludes that the court "effectively created,
under the rubric of parody, a new fair use exception covering rewritings that are not necessarily
parodic," that is, works that do not necessarily ridicule the underlying work. Id. at 2001-02. In
response, I suppose one might argue that Alice Randall could have critiqued the pro-antebellumSouth memes embodied in Gone With the Wind without necessarily copying Margaret Mitchell's
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have disabled an effective weapon against the ideas embodied within a
powerful memeplex. The problem, of course, is how to distinguish the
critical from the merely derivative. Where the appellate court (and Lessig)
see The Wind Done Gone as largely critical,68 the district court appears to
have viewed it as largely derivative.69 Not having been infected by the
memes from either book,70 I will remain neutral on the fact issue. The
principle embodied in Suntrust Bank, however, may be an important one
for future cases, to the extent that we wish to encourage memetic diversity.
One final thought centers on Lessig's discussion of "property." Lessig
notes that the concept of private property is essential to the optimal use of
land and other scarce resources, but he cautions against applying the
property concept in exactly the same way to intellectual "property." 7 ' One
reason for this distinction is that intellectual property, unlike real and
personal property, is nonrivalrous, meaning that many people can use the
same work of authorship or patented invention without depleting it;72 other
reasons relate to the unique transaction costs and other costs that would
arise if every use of another's idea required compensation.73 These
concerns, which are hardly new,74 probably explain among other things the
constitutional mandate that copyrights and patents subsist for only "limited
times."75 As Lessig and others have noted, however, rhetorical appeals to
the sanctity of property-for example, to the idea that intellectual property
should be as robust as other forms of property, notwithstanding its peculiar
characteristics-have become common and may have facilitated the
expansion of intellectual property rights in recent years.76 The proliferation

specific memeplexes (characters, plot, etc.). The issue then becomes the familiar factual inquiry into
whether the defendant took more than was necessary to effectively make her point. See Campbell,
510 U.S. at 573, 587, 589. To the extent that the expression in Gone With the Wind powerfully and
persuasively replicates the more fundamental idea-memes, however, the use of some portions of that
precise expression may be the most effective counter to the idea-memes.
68. See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1270-71; Lessig, supra note 1, at 765.
69. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1378 (N.D. Ga.),
rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11 th Cir. 2001).
70. But I did see the movie of Gone With the Wind a long time ago, and I have read the
opinions in Suntrust Bank. So I guess I have been infected with at leastsome of the relevant memes.
71. See Lessig, supra note I, at 775-76.
72. See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth
Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 562-63 (1998).
73. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 7-8.

74. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE
COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1011, 1015 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943) (noting the nonrivalrous nature of
ideas).
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 8.
76. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 775-76; see also Cotter, supra note 72, at 564; Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death ofCommon Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1693-97
(1999); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship andthe Rhetoric ofProperty,75 TEX. L. REV. 873,
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of the "property meme" in contexts in which it makes little if any sense,
from the standpoint of public policy, may be a particularly telling example
of a rogue meme, replicating without regard to the interests of its human
hosts."

One possible critique of the approach outlined in this Essay is that all
or most of the legal implications I have suggested above may follow from
other, more conventional analyses, and that memetics therefore does not
really add anything new to the mix. As Daniel Farber has written, however,
with respect to legal doctrine "an interlocking web of belief, in which each
belief is supported by many others rather than by a single foundational
'brick,' is inherently far sturdier than a tower.""8 Memetics arguably does
provide something valuable even if it only provides new reasons for certain
results, or illuminates standard problems from a new perspective. I would
be interested in hearing from interested readers as I elaborate upon these
ideas within the context of the more comprehensive work-in-progress.

895-904 (1997) (reviewing

JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE

CONsTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)).
77. More specifically, the property meme operates to the benefit of memeplex owners, but
not to users-and perhaps not to the owners either, if we consider their long-term interest in
maintaining a commons from which to draw source material for future work.
It might be instructive to come up with a list of other legal concepts, useful enough within the
limited contexts that engendered them, that later expanded into realms in which they have done
more harm than good. Lessig's examples of doctrines that originated under different technological
backgrounds than those which exist today might fall within this class. See, e.g., Lessig, supranote
1,at 769.
78. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution,72 MiNN. L. REv. 1331,
1336 (1988); see alsoCotter, supranote 45, at 2084 n.52 (noting similar expressions in the writings
of other writers).
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